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This paper studies a model where exclusive dealing (ED) can both promote investment and foreclose a more efficient 
supplier. While investment promotion is usually regarded as a pro-competitive effect of ED, our paper shows that it may be 
the very reason why a contract that forecloses a more efficient supplier is signed. Absent the effect on investment, the 
contract would not be signed and foreclosure would not be a concern. For this reason, considering potential foreclosure and 
investment promotion in isolation and then summing them up may not be a suitable approach to assess the net effect of ED. 
The paper therefore invites a more cautious attitude towards accepting possible investment promotion arguments as a 
defence for ED. 
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Exclusive contracts require a buyer to purchase only from one seller, and their possible eects on
competition has been at the centre of attention of economists and lawyers for a long time.
Antitrust courts began to investigate the possible foreclosure eects of such contracts a long
time ago, and the case law contains several examples of companies which have been found to have
infringed antitrust laws due their use of exclusive clauses.1 The industrial organization literature
has struggled to explain why contracts may serve anticompetitive purposes, but by now there
are a number of papers which have shown that exclusive dealing (ED) may deter ecient entry
and which analyze the conditions under which this can occur. This literature on what we would
call "foreclosing eect" of ED is composed among others by the contributions of Aghion and
Bolton (1985), Rasmusen, Ramseyer and Wiley (1991), Bernheim and Whinston (1998), Segal and
Whinston (2000a), Fumagalli and Motta (2006), Simpson and Wickelgren (2007).
On the other hand, there is also consensus that exclusive contracts may in certain circumstances
serve eciency-enhancing ends by protecting the relation-specic investment of the exclusive-right
holder against opportunistic hold-up (think for instance of a manufacturer that invests in order to
improve the services of a common retailer, thereby failing to entirely appropriate the benets of its
investment). This "investment promotion eect" of ED has been analyzed by Besanko and Perry
(1993), Segal and Whinston (2000b), De Meza and Selvaggi (2007), Groh and Spagnolo (2004) and
Vasconcelos (2008).
Currently, under US case-law the procompetitive rationale of exclusive contracts seems to pre-
vail: it is very infrequent that rms endowed with monopoly power are found to have infringed the
Sherman Act due to the use of exclusive clauses. On the contrary, in Europe it is the exclusionary
eects of exclusive deals which are emphasised: in the EU exclusive contracts by dominant rms
are ruled out by a de facto per se prohibition rule, and eciency eects are usually not even
considered in competition policy cases.
These very dierent treatments of exclusive dealing may soon come to an end, as both in the
US and in the EU the policy towards monopolization or abusive practices is being reconsidered,2
and many observers argue in favour of an approach where exclusive contracts must be assessed by
weighing the foreclosing eect and the investment promotion eect of exclusive contracts against
each other.
However, the current theory does not facilitate this task because it analyses the two potential
eects of ED in isolation. More precisely, the literature on investment promotion abstracts from
the risk of foreclosure by assuming that the initial contract is renegotiable,3 while the literature
on potential forecloure (which instead assumes that the initial contract is not renegotiable) does
1Among early important decisions involving exclusive dealing arrangements, see Standard Fashion Co. v.
Magrane-Houston Co. [258 U.S. 346 (1922)], Standard Oil Co. of California v. U.S. [337 US 293 (1949)], and
U.S. v. United Shoe Machinery Corporation [347 U.S. 521 (1954)]. Among recent cases, see Sch oller v. Commission,
European Court Case T-9/95, U.S. v. Microsoft (1995 Consent Decree), U.S. v. Dentsply [399 F.3d 181 (2001)],
Conwood v. United States Tobacco [290 F.3d 768 (2002)] and U.S. v. Visa USA [344 F.3d 229 (2003)].
2U.S. Courts take the anti-competitive eects of exclusive dealing more seriously in several recent cases (such as
the ones mentioned in footnote 1 above). The European Commission has recently signalled its intention to move
towards a rule of reason approach. See the recent Guidance on the Commission's Enforcement Priorities in Applying
Article 82 EC Treaty to Abusive Exclusionary Conduct by Dominant Undertakings, December 2008.
3The approach used by Besanko and Perry (1993) is slightly dierent because foreclosure issues are avoided by
assuming that manufacturers face perfectly elastic supply of potential retail outlets.
1not model the possibility that the parties involved in the exclusive contract can engage in relation-
specic investment.
The purpose of this paper is to contribute to ll this gap by oering a simple but unifying
framework where exclusivity may give rise to both inecient foreclosure and investment promotion.
We show that the interaction between these two eects provides interesting insights on the welfare
eects of exclusive dealing contracts.
To this aim, we consider a model where an incumbent supplier oers a buyer an exclusive
contract which cannot be renegotiated. If signed, this contract commits the buyer not to purchase
from an alternative supplier. After exclusivity is signed or rejected, (non-contractible) investment
decisions are taken. An investment - which can be made by either the incumbent or the buyer -
increases the value of trade between the incumbent and the buyer, and may also have an external
eect, i.e. it may increase or decrease the value of the transaction between the buyer and the
entrant supplier. Then, price decisions are taken. If no exclusive contract has been signed, the
incumbent and the rival supplier compete to serve the buyer.
In our model, absent investments there is none of the usual features which are known to
result in foreclosure of ecient entrants. Instead, we show that the promotion of investments -
usually considered a welfare benecial eect of exclusive contracts - might make them exclusionary.
Indeed, a contract that forecloses a more ecient supplier may be signed precisely because it
fosters investment. Therefore, we identify here a new reason why exclusive dealing might be an
exclusionary practice.
Let us be more precise. In our setting, absent any eect of ED on investment, an exclusive
contract which leads to inecient foreclosure would not be signed in equilibrium (in other words,
the Chicago School critique applies). The reason is that the contract, if signed, benets the
incumbent but causes a loss to the buyer. Since the lowest compensation that the buyer requires
to sign is larger than the incumbent's gain, it follows that the incumbent could never elicit the
buyer's acceptance in a protable way. Instead, when one takes into account investment promotion,
it turns out that an exclusive contract which leads to inecient foreclosure is signed. The reason is
that investment promotion, by increasing the value of trade between the incumbent and the buyer,
mitigates the buyer's loss due to exclusivity and expands the incumbent's gain. If this eect is
suciently strong, the buyer and the incumbent have a private incentive to agree on exclusivity.
However, investment promotion may be too weak to make the incumbent more ecient than the
rival supplier and the decision to agree on exclusivity, by foreclosing the more ecient producer,
may be welfare detrimental.
We also show that considering the risk of foreclosure and investment promotion in isolation,
disregarding their interaction, does not provide a correct measure of the net eect of ED on welfare.
Indeed, we show that if one focuses on the risk of foreclosure abstracting from investment promotion
(i.e. if one assumes that the exclusive contract is not renegotiable and that it does not aect
investments), it would conclude that ED does not raise any concern because it would not be signed
at equilibrium. Also, if one focuses on investment promotion abstracting from potential foreclosure
(i.e. if one allows ED to stimulate investment and to be renegotiated), under some parameter
congurations it would conclude that ED is welfare benecial. Hence, evaluating separately the
risk of foreclosure and investment promotion and 'summing them up' would lead to conclude that
the overall eect of ED on welfare is positive. However, if one allows for foreclosure and investment
promotion to operate simultaneously (i.e. if one allows ED to promote investment but rules out
2renegotiation) it would obtain the opposite conclusion: for the same parameter congurations, ED
would be welfare detrimental.
Finally, we show that the identity of the investor and the sign of the external eect are impor-
tant determinants of the welfare eect of exclusive dealing. In particular, if the incumbent invests,
it is more likely that investment promotion facilitates inecient foreclosure when the investment
has a positive external eect, i.e. when it increases the value of trade between the buyer and the
rival supplier. Instead, if the buyer is the investing party, investment promotion leads more likely
to foreclosure when the external eect is negative. Finally, disregarding the interaction between
investment promotion and foreclosure is more likely to be misleading when the incumbent invests
and the external eect is positive and suciently strong.
As mentioned above, our paper is related both to the literature on ED and investment promo-
tion and to the literature on ED and foreclosure, building a bridge between the two. The paper
closest to ours is probably Segal and Whinston (2000b), which shows in a very general frame-
work that the investment-stimulating role of ED depends crucially on the nature of the external
eect and the identity of the investor. The main dierence between our paper and theirs is that
central to our analysis is the case where the exclusive dealing contract is not renegotiable, while
renegotiation is feasible in Segal and Whinston (2000b).4 This leads to the following dierences
in predictions. First, in Segal and Whinston (2000b) ED does not play any role in promoting
investment when the external eect is absent (denoted as the Irrelevance Result), while this is
not the case in our paper.5 Second, we nd that ED may be welfare detrimental also because in-
vestment promotion may facilitate foreclosure and not only because it leads the buyer-incumbent
coalition to undertake socially wasteful investment with the aim of extracting more rents from the
entrant (a possible eect which has been highlighted also by Spier and Whinston 1995 in a model
which introduced renegotiation in the setting of Aghion and Bolton 1987). Overall, we regard our
analysis as complementary to theirs.
More generally, our paper is related to the law and economics literature, initiated by Shavell
(1980), which studies the impact of both privately stipulated and court-imposed contractual dam-
ages on investment incentives.6
Finally, our paper is related to the literature on hold-up and vertical integration.7 Indeed, both
vertical integration and exclusive dealing mitigate (or solve) the hold-up problem by aecting the
disagreement payos that the agents obtain ex-post when trade conditions are to be established.
4We also study the case where the initial contract can be renegotiated (obtaining results very similar to Segal
and Whinston 2000b) but such a case is not the focus of our paper and is functional to show that disregarding the
interaction between investment promotion and foreclosure may be misleading.
5Some recent contributions provide an alternative explanation of why ED may aect investment even in the
absence of external eects. De Meza and Selvaggi (2007) emphasize that the Irrelevance Result depends on some
properties of the renegotiation procedure assumed by Segal and Whinston (2000b). Vasconcelos (2008) highlights
the role of asymmetric information at the contracting stage. In such an environment, absent exclusivity the better
informed principal can extract surplus from the agent through informative signalling, but at the cost of distorting
the agent's investment incentives. Exclusivity allows to resolve such con
ict and restores eciency of the investment
decision. Finally, Groh and Spagnolo (2004) emphasizes that exclusivity may aect the parties' loss to a delayed
agreement in the subsequent negotiation for terms of trade, which in in turn aects their patience, hence their
relative bargaining power and thus the incentives to invest.
6See, among the others, also Leitzel (1989), Chung (1992), Spier and Whinston (1995) and Edlin and Reichelstein
(1996).
7See the seminal contributions by Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990). See also Hart (1995)
for a comprehensive exposition.
3This aects the allocation of ex-post surplus, which in turn determines the ex-ante investment
incentives. ED exerts such an eect by depriving the buyer of the possibility to trade with alter-
native suppliers. Vertical integration does not prohibit external trade, but it assigns control rights
over assets to one of the involved parties, thereby reducing the payo obtained by the other party
in case of external trade.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the model and discusses its assumptions.
Section 3 presents a simple example which aims at illustrating why considering jointly the risk of
foreclosure and investment promotion gives rise to new insights. Section 4 represents the central
part of our paper and identies under which conditions ED, by promoting investment, makes in-
ecient foreclosure more likely. Section 5 highlights under which circumstances disregarding the
interaction between investment promotion and the risk of foreclosure leads to misleading conclu-
sions. Section 6 will discuss a few extensions, while Section 7 will conclude the paper.
2 The model
We consider a model with three agents, a buyer (B), an incumbent seller (I) and an alternative
supplier (or potential entrant, E). At date 0; the buyer and the incumbent write a contract. At
the initial contracting stage, B and I can sign an exclusive dealing contract which prohibits B
from trading with E. We assume that the initial contract is incomplete, in the sense that it cannot
specify the terms of future trade because the nature of trade is hard to describe in advance. The
only possible term in the initial contract, aside a lump-side payment, is the exclusivity provision.
In other words, the only fact that can be described ex-ante and veried ex-post is that B does not
conduct any trade with another seller.8
At date 1, after the contract is signed, but before trade, either I or B may undertake non-
contractible investment which aects the value of ex-post trade.9
Finally, at date 2 trade occurs.10
Central to our analysis is the case where the exclusive dealing contract cannot be renegotiated
before trade takes place.11 We make this assumption because we want to assess the welfare eects
of ED in a setting where investment promotion and the risk of inecient foreclosure can arise
8This form of contract incompleteness is typically assumed in the literature investigating either potential fore-
closure of ED (see for instance Rasmusen et al. 1991 and Segal and Whinston 2000a) or investment promotion
(see Segal and Whinston 2000b and De Meza and Selvaggi 2007). This assumption, albeit extreme, captures the
diculty of contractually specifying all aspects of performance and allows to study the eects of exclusivity and the
interaction of foreclosure and investment promotion in the simplest possible setting where incompleteness is present.
9If the investment could be specied directly in the initial contract, exclusivity would not be necessary for
promoting investment.
10We do not model explicitly an entry decision, and assume instead that rm E can always supply the market
if protable. Assuming positive entry costs and letting the entrant decide on entry after investment decisions are
taken would not add further insights to the analysis.
11The existence of transaction costs may explain why renegotiating the exclusive contract may be too costly. For
instance, it may require legal services, or it may involve lengthy procedures and uncertain court decisions (which
might imply that the buyer will be left without consuming the good until the court's judgment has been made or the
new agreement has been found). Moreover, the negotiation activity itself may involve substantial eort, time and
resources and be quite costly. Researchers usually treat renegotiation as either costless or prohibitively costly. See
Schwartz and Watson (2004) for a recent paper where costs of contracting and renegotiation can take intermediate
values and the contracting parties can themselves in
uence these costs. Also, a technological commitment that
eliminates the possibility to trade with E can make renegotiation impossible.
4simultaneously. We relax this assumption in Section 5.
For simplicity, we assume that the buyer demands at most one unit of a good produced either
by I or E: The two suppliers are equally ecient (their marginal costs of production are normalised
to zero: cE = cI = 0) but, absent investments, the buyer's valuation for E's product is larger:
vE > vI:
If either B or I invests x into their relationship, which entails a cost C(x) = (
x2)=2; B's
valuation for the incumbent's product becomes vI + x.12 However, the investment may also have
an external eect, i.e. it may aect the value of the relationship between B and E which becomes
vE+x. The parameter  2 [ 1;1) measures the intensity of the external eect. When  = 0; only
the internal value of the relationship between I and B is aected. When  > 0; the investment
increases not only the internal value of the transaction, but also the value of trade between B and
E: This is the case that Segal and Whinston (2000b) denote as complementary investment eects.
Consider, for instance, the case of a manufacturer that invests in technical training of a retailer
in order to improve the quality of the retailing service. Such an investment may benet also the
relationship of the retailer with other manufacturers of similar products. Instead, when  < 0; an
investment that increases the internal value deteriorates the value of the external relationship. This
case is denoted by Segal and Whinston (2000b) as substitutable investment eects. For instance,
an investment that improves compatibility between a seller's input and a buyer's equipment and
production processes or that tailors the buyer's inter-organizational communication systems to
those of a particular input supplier may make it more costly to use alternative inputs. Similarly,
a retailer may focus its promotional eort on a specic product, with detriment to other products
that it distributes.13
Finally, we model pricing decisions at date 2 in the following way. With a probability b it is
the buyer who makes the price oer, and with probability 1   b it is the supplier(s) who makes
them. For simplicity we limit ourselves to consider the case where b = 1=2; but we shall discuss
what happens under more general values of b whenever it may lead to dierent outcomes.14
3 A simple example
Before solving the model, let us propose a simple example which captures some features of the
game we analyse more rigorously below and which illustrates the main intuition why combining
foreclosure and investment promotion of exclusive dealing may give rise to new insights.
Consider rst a situation where - like in the literature on the `foreclosing eect' of ED -
investment is not possible (or is innitely costly) and the exclusive dealing contract cannot be
renegotiated (Case I in Figure 1). Absent exclusivity (denoted as NoED), trade occurs with the
more ecient supplier (rm E), generating total surplus vE: The buyer appropriates (vE + vI)=2
12We do not consider explicitly investment decisions by E. However the valuation of E's good can be thought of
as determined by an entrant's exogenous investment.
13We constrain  to be smaller than 1 because we nd it reasonable that the investment in the internal relationship
does not exert stronger benecial eects on the external one. We constrain  to be larger than  1 for simplicity's
sake, but this assumption does not aect the results in a signicant way. We will discuss when allowing for  smaller
than  1 leads to additional insights.
14The only restriction that we need to impose is the exclusion of the extreme cases where neither the buyer nor
the incumbent has the power to decide prices (i.e. where b = 1 or b = 0). In those cases, one would trivially obtain
that ED can never strengthen investment incentives.
5out of this value: When it can make the oer - which occurs with probability 1=2 - it requires
the good for free from rm E. When suppliers make the oer, asymmetric Bertrand competition
takes place. The incumbent's best deal is to sell the good for free, which generates value vI. Firm
E can beat this oer leaving the buyer with the same payo vI and appropriating the additional
value (vE  vI) that its good generates: In both cases the incumbent does not sell and its payo is
zero. The agents' payos absent exclusivity are then the ones indicated in Figure 1 (Case I, right
panel). Under exclusivity (denoted as ED), trade with rm E is not possible. The total value that
can be generated is vI and is shared evenly between the buyer and the incumbent as indicated in
the Figure. It can be easily seen that while the buyer is harmed by the introduction of exclusivity,
as it loses the possibility to trade with the more ecient producer and to benet from suppliers'
competition, the incumbent benets from it. However, the incumbent's gain is smaller than the
buyer's loss, which implies that the incumbent cannot protably compensate the buyer in order
to elicit acceptance on exclusivity. This is an alternative way to state the Chicago School result
that an exclusive dealing contract that forecloses a more ecient supplier would not be signed in
equilibrium. Hence, in this situation ED does not raise any concern.
Consider now a situation where it is still impossible to renegotiate the exclusive dealing contract,
but where the incumbent can invest into the relationship with the buyer at an arbitrarily low cost
". Assume that absent ED the incumbent chooses not to invest (xNoED = 0) so that total welfare
is still vE, while under ED the investment is undertaken (xED > 0).15 As shown by Figure 1 (Case
II), the investment promoted by ED, by increasing the value of trade with the incumbent which
becomes vI +xED, increases both the buyer's and the incumbent's payo under exclusivity. This
mitigates the buyer's loss due to the introduction of exclusivity and expands the incumbent's gain,
as compared to the situation where investment promotion is not taken into account. If investment
promotion is large enough, as in Figure 1 (Case II), it becomes protable for the incumbent to elicit
the buyer's acceptance. However, if investment promotion is insucient to make the incumbent
ex-post more ecient (i.e. if vI +xED < vE as in the Figure), the buyer and the incumbent have a
private incentive to agree on a contract which, by prohibiting trade with a more ecient supplier,
is welfare detrimental.
The comparison between these situations illustrates the intuition for our rst result: the fact
that ED fosters investment does not necessarily make inecient foreclosure less of a concern.
Indeed, a contract which leads to inecient foreclosure may be signed precisely because it promotes
investment.
Finally, consider a situation - in line with the literature on `investment promotion' - where
investment is possible and the exclusive dealing contract can be renegotiated. Assume that the
renegotiation procedure is such that investment incentives are the same as in the case where
renegotiation is not possible: absent exclusivity the incumbent does not invest and total surplus is
vE, while under exclusivity the incumbent invests the same amount xED: What makes a dierence
is that renegotiation removes foreclosure, i.e. when the incumbent is ex-post less ecient than rm
E, trade with the latter is possible even though the ED is in place. This has two implications. First,
it allows to benet from the additional surplus created by the more ecient supplier, leaving the
negotiating parties at least as well o as in the case where the contract is complied. In turn, this
(weakly) reduces the buyer's loss due to the introduction of exclusivity, and (weakly) increases
15The model will endogenise the investment choice and the eect of ED on investment incentives and will identify
the precise conditions under which the situation illustrated in the example arises.
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Case III: Investment + Renegotiation 
Figure 1: Gains and losses from Exclusive Dealing (ED)
the incumbent's gain compared to the case of no renegotiation, thereby making even easier for
the incumbent to elicit acceptance on exclusivity.16 Secondly, and more importantly, the fact that
renegotiation allows to trade with rm E implies that society can take advantage of the investment
promoted by ED also through the external eect which, when positive, increases the value of such
trade. Hence, ED turns out to be welfare benecial (vE +xED  " > vE), as Figure 1 (Case III)
shows.
These three cases illustrate the intuition for our second result. In this example, one who focuses
- as in Case I - on the risk of foreclosure disregarding investment promotion, would conclude that
ED does not serve any anti-competitive purposes. One who focuses - as in case III - on investment
16Section 5.1, where we analyse the case of feasible renegotiation, will clarify why agents' payos are the ones
indicated in Figure 1 (Case III).
7promotion disregarding foreclosure, would conclude that ED is welfare benecial. Hence, consid-
ering these eects separately and `summing them up' would lead to a positive evaluation of the
eects of ED. Instead, considering the interaction between foreclosure and investment promotion
would lead to the opposite conclusion.
Of course, this example is very stylised, and in particular the investment choice and the eect
of ED on investment incentives were all taken as exogenous. We now turn to our formal model
where we endogenise these elements and thus we study more rigorously the eects at play in a
setting where exclusive clauses can have both foreclosure and investment promotion eects.
4 When investment promotion facilitates foreclosure
In this section we assume that the exclusive dealing contract is not renegotiable. Section 4.1 will
illustrate the case where the incumbent is the investing agent. Section 4.2 will show that the main
results extend to the case where the buyer invests. We solve the game by backward induction and
we start from the last stage of the game where prices are decided for given contractual decision
and investment decision.
4.1 The incumbent invests
4.1.1 Last stage payo: the eect of ED for given investment
When the ED has been agreed upon, the buyer can trade only with the incumbent. When the
incumbent makes the oer (which occurs with probability 1=2), it charges the monopoly price
vI + x; when the buyer makes the oer it requires the good for free. Hence, under exclusivity B
and I share evenly the value of trade vI + x . Firm E does not sell in this case and its payo is
zero. The agents' payos (gross of investment costs) under exclusivity are indicated in the second
column of Table 1 below.
When no ED has been signed, the agents' payos depend on which good exhibits higher val-
uation after the investment. Let us start from the case where ex-post E's good is still valued
more by the buyer (i.e. vE + x  vI + x). We will denote this case as the one where rm E
is ex-post more ecient. With probability 1=2 the buyer makes the oer, requires E's good for
free and appropriates entirely the value of trade vE +x. With probability 1=2 suppliers compete
for the buyer. The pricing game is a standard asymmetric Bertrand game. Firm I's best oer is
pI = 0. At this price, B's surplus is vI + x: Therefore rm E can win the buyer oering a price
pE = vE + x   (vI + x) and appropriates the additional value that its good generates. Firm I's
does not sell and its payo is zero. The argument is similar when it is I's good that is valued
more ex-post (i.e. when vI + x > vE + x). In this case, it is rm E that does not sell and the
incumbent appropriates the additional value generated by its good. The third column of Table 1
below reports the agents' payos absent exclusivity (gross of investment costs).
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Table 1: Agents' payos with and without exclusivity
Table 1 highlights that, for given investment, signing an exclusive dealing contract benets the
incumbent and harms both the buyer and the entrant. Note, however, an important distinction.
When the incumbent is ex-post more ecient (i.e. when vI + x > vE + x), ED redistributes
welfare in favour of the incumbent but leaves total welfare unchanged. The buyer's loss is due
to the fact that ED removes competition between the sellers, but trade none the less occurs with
the more ecient supplier, namely the incumbent. Since rm E's payo is zero irrespective of





Instead, when the entrant is more ecient ex-post, by forcing trade with the incumbent ED
forecloses the more ecient supplier and it not only redistributes total welfare but it also reduces








4.1.2 The eects of ED on investment incentives











where I(x) is given by Table 1. Lemma 1 describes the optimal incumbent's choice.
Lemma 1. (Investment choice)
(i) Under exclusivity, the optimal level of the investment is xED = 1=(2
):
(ii) Absent exclusivity, the incumbent invests if the investment cost is suciently low (
 < 
). In
this case the optimal level of the investment is xNoED = (1   )=(2
): Otherwise, the incumbent
chooses not to invest (xNoED = 0).
The threshold level of the investment cost is 
 = (1   )2=4(vE   vI):
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
Note that, absent exclusivity, the incumbent chooses not to invest, if the investment cost is
high enough (
  
). Intuitively, if the investment is insucient to make the incumbent more
ecient ex-post (x < (vE   vI)=(1   )), investing entails costs but does not provide any benet,
as post-investment competition results in the incumbent making no sales (see Table 1). Also, since
the investment cost is high, investing so much that the incumbent becomes ex-post more ecient
is not protable either.
It is now possible to evaluate the eect of ED on investment incentives:
9Lemma 2. (Eect of ED on investment incentives)
When the ED is not renegotiable and the incumbent invests:
(i) if the external eect is positive ( > 0), exclusive dealing always promotes investment: xED >
xNoED;
(ii) if the external eect is (weakly) negative (  0), exclusive dealing promotes investment if
(and only if) the investment cost is suciently large (
  
); ED (weakly) hinders investment
otherwise.
The threshold 
 is the one characterised by Lemma 1.
Proof. It follows immediately from Lemma 1.
The idea is that, by prohibiting trade with rm E, ED removes suppliers' competition. When
the investment cost is large enough, this always increases the marginal benet of the investment
and induces the incumbent to invest more relative to the case where there is no ED. When instead
the investment cost is low, the eect of removing competition on the marginal benet of the
investment depends on the sign of the external eect.
To see why, let us start from the situation where the investment cost is large enough (
  
).
As Lemma 1 shows, absent ED the incumbent does not invest: investing so much as to become
ex-post more ecient is too costly; investing less does not provide any benet as the incumbent
will not be able to compete successfully with rm E. Instead, under exclusivity trade must occur
with the incumbent and generates value vI + x: When it makes the oer - which occurs with
probability 1=2 - the incumbent appropriates this value. For this reason, under exclusivity the
incumbent benets from additional investment even though the investment level is insucient to
make it ex-post more ecient, which makes the marginal benet of the investment higher and
investment incentives stronger (i.e. @ED
I (x)=@x = 1=2 > 0 = @NoED
I (x)=@x). Note that this
eect of ED works irrespective of the sign of the external eect.
Instead, when the investment cost is suciently low (
 < 
), absent ED investing so much
as to become ex-post more ecient is protable for the incumbent. In such a case, as a result of
suppliers' competition, the incumbent obtains a payo equal to its ex-post eciency advantage
(vI +x vE  x), when it makes the oer. Hence, when the investment is decided, the incumbent
takes into account that additional investment not only increases the value of its trade with the buyer
(vI+x) but also aects the value of trade between the buyer and the rival supplier (vE+x). When
 > 0, the external eect is detrimental to the incumbent: by increasing the value of trade between
B and E; higher investment makes the rival supplier more ecient and decreases the incumbent's
ex-post eciency advantage. For this reason, absent exclusivity investment incentives are weaker
relative to the case where the ED is in place, suppliers' competition is removed and the investment
is driven only by the internal eect (i.e. @NoED
I (x)=@x = (1   )=2 < 1=2 = @ED
I (x)=@x).
Instead, when  < 0, the external eect is benecial to the incumbent: by deteriorating the value
of trade between B and E; higher investment makes the rival supplier less ecient and increases the
incumbent's ex-post eciency advantage. For this reason, absent exclusivity investment incentives
are stronger relative to the case where the ED is in place. (i.e. @NoED
I (x)=@x = (1   )=2 >
1=2 = @ED
I (x)=@x).
Note that when the investment cost is low (
 < 
), it is precisely the existence of the external
eect that makes ED relevant for investment incentives. If the investment has no external eect
10(i.e.  = 0), ED makes the incumbent earn a larger payo but it does not aect the investment
benets at the margin, thereby leaving the equilibrium choice unchanged. Using the terminology of
Segal and Whinston (2000b), who highlighted rst this important insight, the "irrelevance result"
holds.17
Instead, when the investment cost is suciently large (
  
), the "irrelevance result" does not
hold and ED increases the marginal benet of the investment even when  = 0: This dierent result
is not due simply to the fact that the incumbent's payo is null absent exclusivity and becomes
positive when the ED is agreed upon. Rather, it is due to the fact that the positive payo obtained
under exclusivity is sensitive to investment. In turn this follows from our assumption that ED is
not renegotiable so that the surplus shared ex-post is vI +x: Hence, ED increases the incumbent's
payo by a term which responds to investment also when  = 0: Instead, Segal and Whinston
(2000b) assumes that (i) the initial contract is renegotiable so that when trade occurs, the parties
are always able to appropriate the highest available surplus; (ii) the negotiation procedure is such
that ED increases the incumbent's payo by a term (the maximum surplus that the buyer and
the entrant can generate) which does not depend on investment when the external eect is absent.
For this reason, ED has no impact on investment incentives when the investment does not exert
external eects.18
4.1.3 Contract decision and welfare eects
At date 1, the incumbent and the buyer decide on exclusivity. Lemma 3 shows that the ED
contract is more likely to be signed when the external eect is positive and when the investment
cost is suciently low. Proposition 1 shows that for intermediate values of the investment cost the
signed contract, by leading to inecient foreclosure, is welfare detrimental.
Lemma 3. (Contractual choice)
When the ED is not renegotiable and the incumbent invests, there exist a threhosld level of the
investment cost, 




(i) if the external eect is positive ( > 0), the ED is signed in equilibrium if (and only if) 
 < 
s;
(ii) if the external eect is (weakly) negative (  0), the ED is signed in equilibrium if (and only




Proof. See Appendix A.1.
To see the intuition let us consider rst the case where the external eect is positive. Imagine
there is no exclusive dealing contract and consider the investment xNoED chosen by the incumbent
in this case: By Table 1 we know that introducing exclusivity - keeping the investment xed at
xNoED - benets the incumbent but harms the buyer, and that the buyer's loss is (weakly) larger
17The importance of marginal benets over absolute prot levels for investment incentives has been highlighted also
in recent papers on a variety of topics, ranging from the eect of buyer power on investment incentives (Inderst and
Wey 2007), the eect of regulation in the pharmaceutical industry on R&D eorts (Ganuza, Llobet and Dominguez
2008), to the eect of market design on investment incentives (DeFrutos, Fabra and Van der Fehr, 2008).
18A number of negotiation procedures typically used in the literature exhibit this properties, but there are also
equally reasonable procedures that do not (see DeMeza and Selvaggi, 2007 and discussion is Section 5.1.2).
11than the incumbent's gain: I(xNoED)   B(xNoED):19 Note that the previous inequality
is strict when xED = 0 (i.e. when 
  
) because rm E is more ecient and the introduction
of ED forecloses its activity. It follows that, absent any eect of ED on investment, the Chicago
School Critique applies: the exclusive dealing contract would not be signed in equilibrium because
the lowest compensation that the buyer requires to sign is (weakly) larger than the incumbent's
gain from having the contract signed; then the incumbent could never elicit the buyer's acceptance
is a protable way.
However, by Lemma 2 when the external eect is positive, ED also stimulates the investment
(xED > xNoED). This increases both the incumbent and the buyer's payo under exclusivity
(the former, by revealed preferences; the latter because higher investment increases the value of
internal trade and the buyer appropriates part of this value), thereby mitigating the buyer's loss
due to exclusivity and expanding the incumbent's gain. The lower the investment cost, the higher
the investment increase spurred by ED, the more likely that the incumbent's gain becomes large





), I and B jointly gain from the introduction of ED and have a private incentive to
agree on it.
ED can promote investment also when the external eect is negative, as long as the investment
cost is large enough (i.e. 
  
 as Lemma 2 shows). In such a case, the same logic illustrated
above applies and the ED is signed if 
 < 
s.20
Instead, if the investment cost is suciently low, ED limits the investment. This makes the
buyer's loss due to the introduction of exclusivity always larger than the incumbent's gain and
explains why B and I dot not have the incentive to enter into an exclusive dealing contract.21
Figure 2 summarizes the contractual choice for the feasible values of the external eect and of the
investment cost.
Let us now analyse the welfare eects of ED. Note that, when deciding on exclusivity, I and
B do not internalize the eect of their decision on rm E and thus on total welfare. Indeed, the
introduction of exclusivity harms rm E when, absent ED, it is rm E that supplies the buyer
- i.e. when 
  
 so that the incumbent does not invest absent exclusivity and rm E is more
ecient. The higher the investment cost, the weaker investment promotion due to ED, the smaller
the increase in B and I's joint payo, the less likely that this increase dominates rm E's loss: It
turns out that, when the investment cost is intermediate, investment promotion is strong enough
19We denote with  payos gross of investment costs and with  net payos. Since we keep investment xed, the
variation of the two due to the introduction of exclusivity is the same.
20There is, however, a dierence with the case where the external eect is positive. When the external eect is






satised. This is the case if (and only if)  > 
s: The reason is that 
 represents the level of investment costs such
that, absent exclusivity, the optimal investment that makes I more ecient ex-post yields zero prots. The stronger
the negative external eect, the lower the investment required to become more ecient ex-post. Hence, when  < 
s;

 is so high that it is always larger than 

s and there is no scope for signing the ED:
21It is important to point out that our assumption that    1 plays a role for this result. As Appendix A.1 will
explain more extensively, if  <  1 (i.e. if the external eect is stronger than the internal one) the higher investment
induced when exclusivity is absent harms the buyer. If this eect is strong enough, B and I would have an incentive
to enter into an exclusive dealing contract because it sti
es (rather than stimulates) the investment. An analogous
argument applies if we maintain the restriction    1 and we allow for b < 1=2: Note however that in these cases
















Figure 2: Contractual choice and welfare eects under no renegotiation (the incumbent invests)
to generate B and I0s private incentive to agree on exclusivity, but it is insucient to make ED
welfare benecial.22
Instead, the introduction of ED does not aect rm E0s payo when it does not supply the
buyer even absent exclusivity - i.e. when 
 < 
 so that the incumbent invests even absent ED
(xNoED > 0) and the investment makes I more ecient. In this case ED is socially optimal
whenever it is privately so. It follows that when the external eect is positive, the ED is signed
and it is welfare benecial. When the external eect is negative, it is both privately and socially
optimal not to sign the exclusive dealing contract.
These results are stated by the following Proposition:
Proposition 1. (Welfare eects of ED)
When the ED is not renegotiable and the incumbent invests, there exists a threshold level of the
investment cost 
w  3=8(vE   vI) with 
w < 
s such that:





(ii) if the external eect is (weakly) negative (  0) the ED is signed and is welfare detrimental






s and s are the ones identied by Lemma 3.
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
An alternative way to see why ED is welfare detrimental is the following. Absent exclusivity,
total welfare amounts to vE because the incumbent does not invest and trade occurs with rm E,
which is the more ecient supplier: The introduction of ED, by forcing trade with the incumbent,
22When 
  
; this argument applies irrespective of the sign of the external eect. However, as explained in
footnote 20, when the external eect is negative an additional restriction ( > 
s) is required to make the ED be





 are compatible). Also, when  is small enough
(more precisely, when   
ww, with the threshold 
ww identied in the proof of Proposition 1; see also Figure 2),
the ED is welfare detrimental whenever it is signed (because 

w  
 when   
ww).
13promotes investment and increases the value of such trade - which becomes vI + xED: When the
investment cost takes intermediate values this eect is suciently strong to make B and I willing
to sign the contract; however, investment promotion is too weak to be benecial for society because
(i) either the incumbent remains less ecient than rm E (vI +xED < vE); (ii) or the incumbent
becomes more ecient than rm E, but achieving such an improvement is too costly for society.
In both cases, ED welfare detrimental because B and I have a socially excessive incentive to use
it.
The Proposition formally states the result that we have already highlighted in the example of
Section 3: an exclusive dealing contract which forecloses a more ecient supplier may be signed
precisely because it promotes investment. To see this, imagine that investment is not possible -
which in our setting corresponds to the case where the investment cost is prohibitively high. As can
be seen in Figure 2, when 
 ! 1 the ED is not signed in equilibrium. The reason is that absent
investment promotion there is no positive eect that can outweigh inecient foreclosure (remember
that vE > vI) so that the incumbent's gain from the introduction of ED is necessarily lower than the
buyers' loss. Hence, foreclosure is not a concern in this case. Instead, when investment is possible
and 
 takes intermediate values; the ED is signed (precisely because investment promotion induces
B and I to agree on it), but is welfare detrimental (because it leads to inecient foreclosure or
wasteful investment by I).
4.2 The buyer invests
We now turn to the case of the buyer investing in the relationship with the incumbent. The
analysis follows the same steps as for the incumbent investing, so we keep it brief. The 
avour
of the results will also be quite similar: the exclusive dealing contract is signed in equilibrium
when the investment cost is suciently low. For intermediate values of the investment cost, the
signed contract is welfare detrimental because it leads to inecient foreclosure. There is, however,
a major dierence: when the buyer invests the ED is signed only if the external eect is negative.
4.2.1 The eect of ED on investment incentives












where B(x) is given by Table 1. The following lemma characterizes the eect of ED on investment
incentives.
Lemma 4. (Eect of ED on investment incentives)
When the ED is not renegotiable and the buyer invests, then ED promotes the investment if (and
only if) the external eect is negative ( < 0):
Proof. By solving the problem 4, it follows immediately that the under exclusivity, the buyer's
optimal level of the investment is xED = 1=(2
); absent exclusivity, the buyer's optimal level of
the investment is xNoED = (1 + )=(2
): The comparison between the two leads to the result
stated in the Lemma.
14The intuition is again that, under exclusivity, investment incentives are entirely determined
by the internal eect: when deciding the investment level the buyer anticipates that trade will
necessarily occur with the incumbent and that, when it makes the oer, it will fully benet from
the increase of the value of such trade due to additional investment. Instead, absent exclusivity,
investment incentives are driven by both the internal eect and the external eect. The reason is
that, when it makes the oer, the buyer extracts the entire value of trade with the more ecient
supplier; when suppliers make the oer, Bertrand competition allows the buyer to obtain the value
of trade with the less ecient supplier. Unless the external eect is zero, additional investment
aects both values of trade and the buyer internalizes both eects. However, when  < 0; the
external eect of the investment is detrimental to the buyer, because it deteriorates the value of
external trade. Then, internalising also this eect when exclusivity is absent makes investment
incentives weaker. The opposite occurs when the  > 0 and the external eect is benecial to the
buyer.23
Note that, absent exclusivity, the external eect of the investment aects the buyer and the
incumbent in opposite directions (provided that the investment is large enough to make the in-
cumbent ex-post more ecient): the buyer is harmed by the external eect precisely when the
incumbent benets from it (and vice-versa). This suggests why, when when investment costs are
suciently low, the eects of ED on investment incentives are opposite in the two cases. Finally,
absent exclusivity, the buyer's benet from investment is independent of the identity of the most
ecient supplier. The eect of ED on investment incentives does therefore not depend on the cost
of investment 
, which determines the productivity dierence between the suppliers.
4.2.2 Contract decision and welfare eects
Once the dierences in the eect of ED on investment incentives are taken into account, the
contractual choice and its welfare eects can be easily understood from the previous analysis of
the incumbent investing.
When the external eect is negative and thus ED stimulates the investment, B and I enter
into an exclusivity agreement for suciently low investment cost 
 (
  e 
s). In such a case, ED
increases investment by a substantial amount, which makes the incumbent's gain from exclusivity
larger than the the buyer's loss. The signed contract is welfare detrimental for intermediate
investment cost (
 2 (e 
w;e 
s)) because the additional investment spurred by ED is not large enough
to make the gain of the buyer-incumbent coalition dominate the welfare loss due to inecient
foreclosure.
When the external eect is positive, ED is never an equilibrium outcome. This result is due
to the fact that ED hinders investment, which makes the buyer's loss due to the introduction of
exclusivity always larger than the incumbent's gain.
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
These results are illustrated by the following Proposition and by Figure 3.
23For a generic b and high enough investment costs, ED stimulates the investment for  low enough. The assump-
tion b = 1=2 implies that such a threshold level of  is exactly zero. When b > 1=2; the threshold is positive, and ED
may stimulate the investment also when the external eect is positive. Viceversa, when b < 1=2 : ED can limit the
investment also when the external eect is negative. However, qualitatively our results would remain unchanged.
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Figure 3: Contractual choice and welfare eects under no renegotiation (the buyer invests)
Proposition 2. (Contractual choice and welfare eects)
When the ED is not renegotiable and the buyer invests, there exist two theshold levels of the in-
vestment costs, e 
s  2 2 2
4(vE vI) and e 
w  4 2 32
8(vE vI) with e 
s  e 
w; such that:
(i) the ED is signed in equilibrium if (and only if) the external eect is negative (  0) and the
investment cost is 
 < e 
s:
(ii) the signed contract is welfare detrimental if (and only if) the external eect is negative ( < 0)
and the investment cost is 
 2 (e 
w;e 
s):
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
5 When evaluating the eects in isolation is misleading
In this Section we assume that after the investment has been done, but before trade takes place,
the exclusive dealing contract can be renegotiated: the buyer and the incumbent negotiate over
the penalty that B must pay to I in order to remove exclusivity and be free to buy from any
supplier. We start the analysis with the case where the incumbent invests (Section 5.1), which
is the one that delivers the more interesting insights, followed by the case where the buyer is the
investing agent (Section 5.2).
By comparing the results obtained in the case of no renegotiation (Section 4) with the ones
that we shall obtain in this Section, we will be able to highlight the importance of taking into
account the interaction between investment promotion and potential foreclosure.
5.1 The incumbent invests
In this Section we assume that the renegotiation procedure is such that the incumbent has no
bargaining power and is left with its disagreement payo. Dierently stated, the penalty paid by
16the buyer in case of breach of exclusivity amounts to the prots that the incumbent would have
obtained if renegotiation had not taken place and the contract had been complied. The reason
why we focus on this special case is that it leaves investment incentives unchanged relative to the
case where ED is not renegotiable.24;25
5.1.1 Last stage payo: the eect of ED for given investment
Given the contractual and the investment decision, the agents' payos at the last stage of the game
are reported by Table 2.
ED NoED




























Table 2: Agents' payos when ED is renegotiable.
Note that the unique case where renegotiation makes a dierence is the one where the ED
has been signed and rm E is ex-post more ecient (if it is the incumbent that is more ecient
ex-post, B and I have no incentive to renegotiate the initial contract). In such a case, the penalty
for breach (as well as the incumbent's payo) amounts to (vI + x)=2; which is the prot that the
incumbent would have made had the contract been complied with. By paying this penalty, the
buyer removes any exclusivity obligation and the terms of trade are established as in the absence of
ED. It follows that the buyer chooses to be supplied by the more ecient rm E; extracting entirely
the value of trade vE + x when it makes the oer, and obtaining the value of the incumbent's
good when suppliers make the oer and (asymmetric) Bertrand competition takes place. Net of
the penalty the buyer's payo is (vE+x)=2. Note also that rm E supplies the buyer and obtains
a positive payo even if the ED is in place, namely it appropriates the additional value that its
good generates (when suppliers make the oer).
Hence, dierently from the case where the initial contract is not renegotiable, now ED does
not lead to the foreclosure of the more ecient supplier. This has two implications on the eect
of ED for given investment. First, the introduction of exclusivity redistributes welfare in favour of
the incumbent without aecting total welfare also when rm E is ex-post more ecient. Second,
the buyer's loss is reduced as compared to the case of no renegotiation and, in our specic model,





24Section 6 discusses the case where the incumbent has some power is determining the penalty for breach.
25An additional reason is that this case is equivalent to the imposition of expectation damages, which are the
damages commonly enforced at least in Civil Law countries (see Macaulay et al. 1995, Hatziz 2001 and Cooter and
Ulen 2004).
175.1.2 The eects of ED on investment incentives
Since our renegotiation procedure leaves the incumbent with its disagreement payo, rm I's
investment choice as well as the eect of ED on investment incentives are the same as in the case
of no renegotiation. Hence, Lemma 1 still applies and ED always stimulates the investment when
the external eect is positive; when the external eect is negative, ED stimulates the investment
only if the investment cost is large enough (i.e. 
  
).26
5.1.3 Contract decision and welfare eects
We now analyze the date 1 decision on whether to sign the exclusive dealing contract and the
associated welfare eects. Figure 4 illustrates the results for the feasible values of the investment
cost and of the external eect. A comparison with Figure 2 makes it apparent that the possibility
to renegotiate the initial contract makes more likely that ED is an equilibrium outcome and that
















Figure 4: Contractual choice and welfare eects under renegotiation (the incumbent invests)
The intuition is simple. The possibility to renegotiate the initial contract removes foreclosure,
i.e. when rm E is ex-post more ecient than the incumbent, trade with the former is possible even
though the ED is in place, which allows society to benet from the additional surplus created by
the more ecient supplier. This has two implications. First, B and I are willing to renegotiate the
initial contract if they obtain at least their disagreement payo, i.e. the payo they are entitled to
if the contract is complied with. It follows that after renegotiation the buyer and the incumbent's
payos under exclusivity cannot but (weakly) increase relative to the case of no renegotiation.
26Note that when the investment cost is large enough (
  
), in our setting it is still the case that the "irrelevance
result" does not hold and ED increases the marginal benet of the investment even when no external eect is exerted
( = 0): This dierent result as compared to Segal and Whinston (2000b) is due to the fact that their (re)negotiation
procedure is such that the introduction of ED increases the incumbent's payo by a term which is insensitive to
investment when the external eect is absent, while our renegotiation procedure does not share this property.
18Then, the buyer's loss due to the introduction of exclusivity cannot but (weakly) decrease and the
incumbent's gain cannot but (weakly) increase relative to that case. This suggests why it becomes
more likely that the ED is signed in equilibrium. Second, total welfare under exclusivity cannot
but (weakly) increase relative to the case of no renegotiation, which suggests why it becomes more
likely that ED is welfare benecial.
More precisely, in our model we have assumed a specic renegotiation procedure such that,
for given investment, introducing exclusivity causes the buyer a loss which coincides with the
incumbent's gain. This implies that, when the external eect is positive, B and I have always an
incentive to agree on exclusivity. ED stimulates the investment. Investment promotion increases
both the incumbent and the buyer's payo under exclusivity: the former by revealed preferences;
the latter because B = maxf(vE + x)=2;(vI + x)=2g and higher investment, either through the
external or the internal eect, increases the value of trade and thus benets the buyer. Then,
the buyer's loss due to exclusivity is mitigated and the incumbent's gain is expanded, making the
latter always dominant.
ED promotes the investment also when the external eect is negative, provided that the in-
vestment cost is large enough (
  
). In this case, while investment promotion increases the
incumbent's payo under exclusivity, it decreases the buyer's one by deteriorating the value of
external trade (B = (vE + x)=2). Hence, the higher investment stimulated by ED expands the
incumbent's gain from exclusivity, but it also expands the buyer's loss. Then, B and I have a
private incentive to sign the ED when the negative external eect is not too strong.
Finally, when the external eect is negative and the investment cost is suciently low (
 < 
),
ED limits the investment. This makes the buyer's loss due to the introduction of exclusivity always
larger than the incumbent's gain and explains why B and I dot not have the incentive to enter
into an exclusive dealing contract.
The introduction of exclusivity may harm rm E also when the initial contract is renegotiable.
When this loss dominates the benet of the buyer-incumbent coalition, the introduction of ED
is welfare detrimental. More precisely, when the investment cost is suciently large (i.e. when

  
), absent exclusivity the incumbent does not invest. Hence, rm E is more ecient, it
supplies the buyer and appropriates its eciency advantage: E = (vE  vI)=2: Under exclusivity,
investment is promoted. This may make the incumbent ex-post more ecient, so that B and I
have no incentive to renegotiate, entry does not occur and rm E makes zero prots. In this case
ED, by fostering investment, forces the entrant to stay out of the market. If instead the incumbent
remains less ecient than the entrant, renegotiation occurs. The entrant makes positive prots
also when ED is in place - E = (vE + xED   vI   xED)=2 - but the investment reduces its
eciency advantage and thus its payo. In this latter case ED, by fostering investment, allows the
buyer-incumbent coalition to extract more rents from the more ecient producer. The weaker the
external eect the larger the loss suered by rm E; also, the higher investment cost, the weaker
investment promotion due to ED, the smaller the increase in B and I's joint payo. Hence, when
the external eect is suciently weak and the investment cost is suciently high, rm E's loss
dominates and ED is welfare detrimental.
These results are stated by the following Proposition:
Proposition 3. (Contractual choice and welfare eects)
When the initial contract is renegotiable and the incumbent invests, there exists two threshold levels
19of the external eect, ss   1=2 > s and w  1=4 such that:
(i) if the external eect is positive ( > 0), the ED is always signed in equilibrium; the signed
contract is welfare detrimental i  2 (0;w) and 
  
w:
(ii) if the external eect is (weakly) negative (  0), the ED is signed in equilibrium if (and only
if)  2 (s;ss) and 
 2 [
;
s) - in this case the signed contract is always welfare detrimental;
or  2 [ss;0] and 
  







s; s and 
ware the ones identied by the previous Lemma and Propositions.
Proof. See Appendix B.1.




s) and  > w; i.e. the area with thick borders in Figure 4) such that ED is welfare
detrimental when the initial contract is not renegotiable, but it turns out to be welfare benecial
when renegotiation is feasible. To see the intuition consider that in this region, absent ED, no
investment takes place and trade occurs with the more ecient rm E which generates value vE:
Under ED, investment is promoted (xED > 0). When the initial contract is not renegotiable
trade must occur with the incumbent. This implies that society can take advantage of investment
promotion only through the internal eect which, as shown by Proposition 1, is insucient in this
region: either vI+xED  vE so that investment promotion is clearly inecient; or vI+xED > vE,
so that investment promotion makes the incumbent more ecient than rm E absent the ED, but
such an improvement is too costly for society. Why does investment promotion become benecial
when the initial contract is renegotiable? The reason is that investment promotion can benet
society also through the external eect: trade with rm E can take place even though the ED is
in place; on top of this, through the external eect, the investment spurred by ED increases the
value of such trade, which becomes vE +xED > vI +xED. If the external eect is positive and
suciently strong, investment promotion becomes worthy for society.
This comparison reiterates the point made in the example of Section 3 that evaluating sepa-
rately the risk of foreclosure and potential investment promotion of ED, disregarding their interac-
tion, does not provide a correct measure of the impact of ED on welfare. More precisely, imagine
that renegotiation is not possible and let investment costs be innite (
 ! 1) so that ED cannot
stimulate investment. This amounts to focusing only on the potential foreclosing eect of ED. As
Section 4.1.3 has shown, in our model ED would not arise in equilibrium and the risk of foreclo-
sure would be absent. Imagine now that renegotiation is possible, so that ED cannot foreclose
ecient entry, and let the investment cost take a nite value, so that ED can stimulate invest-
ment. This amounts to focusing only on the potential pro-competitive eect of ED. In our model,




s)) ED is signed and is welfare benecial. Hence, if considering the two potential eects
in isolation and then summing them up, one would conclude that the risk of foreclosure is absent
while the investment-fostering eect is benecial, so that overall eect of ED on total welfare is
positive. Instead, by allowing for foreclosure and investment promotion to operate simultaneously
(i.e. by letting the investment cost to be nite but ruling out renegotiation) one would obtain a
dierent conclusion: for the same parameters' values, ED would be signed and would be welfare
detrimental.
20Note also that, when the external eect is negative, the situation where renegotiation makes the
welfare eect of ED turn from negative to positive never arises. Intuitively recall that, when the
external eect is negative, for the parameter congurations such that ED is signed in equilibrium,
no investment takes place absent ED, so that trade occurs with the more ecient rm E and it
generates value vE: Under ED, investment is promoted (xED > 0). Recall also that renegotiation
of the initial contract makes a dierence only when investment promotion is insucient to make the
incumbent ex-post more ecient (i.e. when vI +xED  vE+xED). In such a case renegotiation
allows to trade with the more ecient rm E; thereby mitigating the detrimental eect of ED.
However, precisely the fact that the investment deteriorates the value of trade with rm E makes
it impossible that under ED society achieves a higher welfare level as compared to the situation
where no contract is in place and no investment is done (i.e. vE+xED 
(xED)2=2 < vE). This
implies that when the external eect is negative, evaluating the risk of foreclosure and investment
promotion in isolation cannot lead to misleading conclusions.
5.2 The buyer invests
Suppose now that it is the buyer that invests. We also assume that the renegotiation procedure is
such that the buyer has no bargaining power and is left with its disagreement payo. As before,
under this assumption the investment incentives are the same as in the case of no renegotiation,
which allows us to identify the eects of foreclosure in a clearer way.
The possibility to renegotiate an ED contract only plays a role if the value of internal trade is
lower than the value of external trade, vI + x < vE + x. Table 3 reports the agents' payos at
the last stage of the game in this case:
ED NoED















Table 3: Agents' payos when ED is renegotiable.
Lemma 4 shows that ED stimulates investment only if the external eect is negative. Applying
the argument in the proof of Lemma 2, it follows that ED arises in equilibrium only if the external
eect is negative. This implies that there do not exist circumstances where renegotiation turns ED
from being welfare reducing to welfare enhancing. The reason is that when renegotiation matters
for the outcome (vI +x < vE +x), the additional investment due to ED reduces the buyer's value
of trading with the more ecient entrant.
6 Extensions
In this Section we relax some of the assumptions made in the model, and we discuss the possible
application of our analysis to other contexts.
Single buyer vs. multiple buyers The model of Section 2 assumes that there exists a single
buyer. Under the assumption of multiple buyers, our main result that investment promotion may
facilitate foreclosure - thereby worsening rather mitigating the concerns on the detrimental eect
21of ED - is still valid, as long as the incumbent is unable to elicit acceptance on exclusivity absent
the investment.
The recent literature on the 'foreclosing eect' of ED has identied a number of situations
where this is the case:27 (i) when buyers are erce downstream competitors; (ii) when downstream
competition is suciently weak but buyer power is strong or there are weak economies of scale
from the supply side; (iii) when the incumbent cannot discriminate contractual oers and frag-
mented buyers do not suer from coordination failures; (iv) when the incumbent can discriminate
contractual oers but it is not protable for it to fully compensate the critical number of buyers
such that entry is discouraged. Note that in this latter case the scope for investment promotion
to cause inecient foreclosure is wider than in our model. Indeed, to make the ED signed and
inecient foreclosure arise, it is not necessary that investment promotion is so strong to make
it protable for the incumbent to compensate all the buyers, i.e to make the incumbent's total
gain from exclusivity become larger than the loss suered by all the buyers. It is sucient that
investment promotion makes it protable to compensate only the critical number of buyers such
that entry is discouraged.
Our result does not hold when, instead, the ED is signed even absent the investment. In
such a case inecient foreclosure would occur anyway, and investment promotion would mitigate
(possibly remove) the welfare detrimental eect of ED.
Alternative renegotiation procedures Section 5 has analyzed the case where the exclusive
contract can be renegotiated, assuming a specic procedure that leaves the investing agent with
its disagreement payo.
If we assumed that the renegotiation procedure gives the investing agent a share of the ad-
ditional surplus generated by the more ecient entrant, on top of the disagreement payo, we
should also take into account that the investment undertaken when the ED is renegotiable is lower
than the one made when the ED is not renegotiable. The intuition is that under renegotiation the
investing agent internalizes also the fact that higher investment decreases the entrant's eciency
advantage.28 In other words, even though under renegotiation the absolute payo of the investing
agent is larger, it is less sensitive to investment and investment incentives are weaker as compared
with the situation where the ED cannot be renegotiated. Then, under feasible renegotiation it
would be less likely that ED stimulates investment. None the less, the conclusions obtained in
Section 5 would remain qualitatively the same.
Antitakeover provisions These results can be applied to contexts dierent from the debate
on ED, for instance to the corporate governance debate on the eects of antitakeover provisions
(ATPs). These are agreements that make it more dicult to replace the incumbent executives
with new ones after a takeover (which makes them similar to ED), thereby discouraging takeover
attempts.29 Such provisions include shareholder rights plans, staggered elections of Board of
Directors and golden parachutes (i.e. agreements between the rm and top executives specifying
that the latter will receive certain signicant benets if employment is terminated).
27See Rasmusen, Ramseyer and Wiley (1991), Segal and Whinston (2000a), Fumagalli and Motta (2006).
28Note that this holds irrespective of whether the external eect is positive or negative.
29The seminal works of this copious literature are Lipton (1979) and Easterbrook and Fishel (1981). The debate
is summarised at lenght in Romano (1992), Bebchuck (2003) and Hannes (2006).
22The opponents of ATPs argue that they represent an obstacle to the correct functioning of
the market for corporate control because they discourage ecient takeovers, i.e. takeovers that
replace the incumbent management with a more ecient one. The proponents of ATPs argue
instead that they can exert benecial eects that outweigh the above costs. In particular ATPs, by
making managers takeover-proof, can encourage them to undertake rm-specic non-contractible
investments or long-term investments whose returns are likely to be underestimated by (inecient)
markets.30
Our paper contributes to this debate suggesting that the fact that ATPs foster investment does
not necessarily make their welfare detrimental eects less likely. Indeed, shareholders' approval of
ATPs in the rm charter might be a proof that they are optimal from the rm's perspective, while
being detrimental to society since they discourage ecient takeovers.
Covenants not to compete Our paper might also have a bearing on the literature on
covenants not to compete (CNCs) in labour contracts. Legal scholars have argued that the weak
enforcement of CNCs in California is key the economic success of Silicon Valley, because knowledge
sharing through labor mobility is facilitated (Gilson, 1999; Hyde, 2001). Still, other authors
claim that covenants not to compete protect rms' intellectual property and enhance welfare by
stimulating investment in the employer-employee relationship (Rubin and Shedd, 1981; Glick et
al., 2002). Our paper warns that covenants not to compete might be welfare detrimentral precisely
because of investment promotion.
7 Policy implications
It is probably fair to say that there is consensus among economists that exclusive dealing should
be treated under a rule of reason. First, the plainti should make out a prima facie case of anti-
competitive eects. At this stage, the plainti should also provide a theory of harm identifying the
exclusionary motives behind the concerned practice. Second, it would be upon the defendant to
prove that exclusive dealing serves eciency goals (such as protection of investments) in the case
at hand. Finally, if both anti-competitive and eciency eects are proved, an evaluation of the
magnitude of these eects, and a balancing of the two, should be made. Exclusive dealing would
be unlawful if the likely net eect is adverse.
Our analysis might aect the policy towards exclusive dealing in two respects. First, our
paper identies a new situation where exclusive dealing might lead to exclusion of ecient rivals,
thus expanding the set of situations where a possible theory of harm exists. In particular, we
show that even absent fragmentation of buyers, scale economies and other well-known reasons
possibly leading to exclusion, exclusive dealing, by fostering investments, might make it easier for
an exclusive dealing contract deterring ecient entry to be signed.
Second, our analysis suggests that the balancing exercise of any anti- and pro-competitive eects
might be even more complex than already aknowledged, since we show that the very existence of
investment-promotion eects - rather than being only welfare benecial - might actually make it
easier for exclusive dealing to foreclose ecient entry.
30On the former, se Stout and Blair (1999). On the latter, see Stein (1988), Shleifer and Vishny (1990), Lipton
and Rosenblum (1991).
23A Appendix
This Appendix contains the proof for the case where the ED is not renegotiable.
A.1 The incumbent invests
Proof of Lemma 1
















Absent exclusivity, it is never optimal to invest if x  (vE   vI)=(1   ). Investing x >
(vE   vI)=(1   ) makes the incumbent earn the prot:
I(x) =































2 > 0 (6)







Proof of Lemma 3
Case (i): Positive external eect. Take the investment xed at x = xNoED: Introducing
exclusivity causes the incumbent a gain which is (weakly) lower than the buyer's loss (see Table
1):31
I(xNoED) = ED
I (xNoED)   NoED
I (xNoED) (7)
  [ED
B (xNoED)   NoED
B (xNoED)] =  B(xNoED) (8)
Also, by Lemma 2, when  > 0 ED stimulates the investment (xED > xNoED). By revealed
preferences, this increases the incumbent's payo under exclusivity as well as the buyer's payo
(ED




; by Lemma 1, xNoED is such that vI+xNoED > vE+xNoED : Hence, condition
(7) holds as an equality. It follows that ED, by promoting investment, makes the incumbent's gain
31We dene as i with i = I;B the change of surplus of agent i due to the introduction of exclusivity.
24larger than the buyer' loss and the incumbent is always able to elicit acceptance is a protable
way:
ED
I (xED)   NoED
I (xNoED) > ED





B (xNoED)   ED
B (xNoED)
> NoED




; by Lemma 1, xNoED = 0: Since vI < vE by assumption, condition 7 holds as
a strict inequality. Hence, investment promotion must be strong enough to revert the inequality















where xED = 1=(2








Case (ii): Negative external eect.
By Lemma 2, if 
  
; ED promotes investment also when the external eect is negative: The





 i  > 1  
p






 and the external eect is negative, ED limits investment: xED < xNoED:
Take the investment xed at x = xED: When 
 < 
; xED is large enough to make the incumbent
ex-post more ecient: vI + xED > vE + xED (more precisely, vI + xED > vE + xED i

 < b 
 with with b 
  (1 )=2(vE  vI) > 
 for any feasible value of ): It follows that introducing
exclusivity (keeping the investment xed at xED) causes the incumbent a gain which coincides
with the buyer's loss (see Table 1):
I(xED) = ED









However, introducing exclusivity also limits the investment. The higher investment chosen
when exclusivity is absent increases both the incumbent and the buyer's payo absent exclusivity
(the former by revealed preferences, the latter because NoED
B (x) = (vI + x + vE + x)=2 and
   1), thereby decreasing the incumbent's gain and increasing the buyer's loss. It follows that
it is never in B and I0s joint interest to introduce exclusivity:
ED
I (xED)   NoED
I (xNoED) < ED





B (xED)   ED
B (xED)
< NoED
B (xNoED)   ED
B (xED):
25(When  = 0; ED has no eect on investment and ED may be signed by indierence.)
Note that when exclusivity is absent, higher investment has a contrasting eect on the buyer's
payo. On the one hand, higher investment increases the value of trade with the incumbent, which
benets the buyer; on the other hand, higher investment deteriorates the value of trade with rm
E which is detrimental to the buyer. Since we assume that the external eect is weaker than the
external one (i.e.    1), the former eect prevails and, absent exclusivity, the buyer is (weakly)
better o when the investment is higher. If we allowed the negative external eect to be stronger
than the internal one, higher investment would harm the buyer absent exclusivity. If this eect
was strong enough, B and I0s joint payo would be higher when the ED is signed. Dierently from
the case where the external eect is positive, B and I would have an incentive to enter into an
exclusive dealing contract because it sti
es (rather than stimulates) the investment. An analogous
argument applies if we maintain the restriction  >  1 and we allow for b < 1=2:The buyer's payo
absent exclusivity would be given by B = b(vI + x) + (1   b)(vE + x): If  <  b(1   b); higher
investment harms the buyer. If  <  2b=(1   b); B and I are jointly better o under exclusivity.
Proof of Proposition 1
When 
 < 
; rm E0s payo is zero with and without the ED. Hence, total welfare coincides




; rm E is harmed by the introduction of exclusivity, because it supplies the buyer
absent ED. Exclusive deal is welfare detrimental i investment promotion is not strong enough to




























 for any  > 0: Hence, when the external eect is positive, the ED is signed and
is welfare detrimental i 
 2 (
w;
s): Instead, when   0 
w > 
 i  > 1  
p
3=2  ww > s
with ww < 0: Hence, when  2 (s;ww]; whenever the ED is signed it is welfare detrimental;




A.2 The buyer invests
Proof of Proposition 2
Case (i): Negative external eect. Take the investment xed at x = xNoED: Introducing
exclusivity causes the incumbent a gain which is (weakly) lower than the buyer's loss (see Table
1):
I(xNoED) = ED
I (xNoED)   NoED
I (xNoED) (13)
  [ED
B (xNoED)   NoED
B (xNoED)] =  B(xNoED) (14)
Also, by Lemma 4, when  < 0 ED stimulates the investment (xED > xNoED). By revealed
preferences, this increases the buyer's payo under exclusivity as well as the incumbent's payo
(ED
I (x) = (vI + x)=2 is increasing in x), thereby expanding the incumbent's gain and mitigating
the buyer's loss.
26When 
  b 
  (1   2)=2(vE   vI); xNoED is such that vI + xNoED > vE + xNoED
and I(xNoED) =  B(xNoED). It follows that ED, by promoting investment, makes the
incumbent's gain larger than the buyer' loss and the incumbent is always able to elicit acceptance
is a protable way:
ED
I (xED)   NoED
I (xNoED) > ED





B (xNoED)   ED
B (xNoED)
> NoED
B (xNoED)   ED
B (xED):
Note that in this case rm E0s payo is zero with and without the ED. Hence, total welfare
coincides with B and I0s joint payo and ED is welfare benecial whenever B and I have an
incentive to sign it. (When  = 0; ED has no eect on investment and ED may be signed by
indierence.)
When 
 > b 
; xNoED is such that vI + xNoED < vE + xNoED and I(xNoED) <
 B(xNoED). Hence, investment promotion must be strong enough to revert the inequality





















where xNoED = (1 + )=(2
) and xED = 1=(2
): Condition 15 is satised i

 <
2   2   2
4(vE   vI)
 e 
s > b 
:
Note that in this case rm E is harmed by the introduction of exclusivity, because it supplies
the buyer absent ED. Exclusive deal is welfare detrimental i investment promotion is not strong



















vE + xNoED   vI   xNoED
2
(16)
Condition (16) is satised i

 >





 < e 
w < e 
s for  < 0.
Case (ii): Positive external eect.
By Lemma 4, ED limits investment: xED < xNoED: Take the investment xed at x = xED:
Introducing exclusivity (keeping the investment xed at xED) causes the incumbent a gain which
is (weakly) lower than the buyer's loss (see Table 1):
I(xED) = ED









Also, introducing exclusivity limits the investment. The higher investment chosen when ex-
clusivity is absent increases both the incumbent and the buyer's payo absent exclusivity (the
27latter by revealed preferences, the former because NoED
I (x) = maxf0;vI + x   vE   x)=2g and
 < 1), thereby decreasing the incumbent's gain and increasing the buyer's loss. It follows that it
is never in B and I0s joint interest to introduce exclusivity:
ED
I (xED)   NoED
I (xNoED) < ED





B (xED)   ED
B (xED)
< NoED
B (xNoED)   ED
B (xED):
Note that when exclusivity is absent, higher investment has a contrasting eect on the in-
cumbent's payo: by increasing the internal value, it makes the incumbent more ecient, but by
increasing the external value it also makes the rival supplier more ecient. Since we assume that
the external eect is weaker than the internal one, the former eect prevails and, absent exclusivity,
the incumbent is (weakly) better o when investment is higher.
B Appendix
This Appendix contains the proofs for the case where the ED is renegotiable.
B.1 The incumbent invests
Proof of Proposition 3
In order to evaluate when B and I have an incentive to agree on exclusivity and the associated
welfare eects it helps distinguishing between the following two cases:
Case 1: 
 < b 
: In this case the investment chosen under exclusivity is large enough to make the
incumbent ex-post more ecient (vI +xED > vE +xED). Hence, the possibility to renegotiate




; the ED is signed in equilibrium if and only if the external eect is positive





); the ED is signed i 
 < 
s: Recall that 
s > 
 i  > s  1  
p
3 < 0
and note that 
s > b 
 i  > ss   1=2: Hence, in this case the ED is signed either for any
 2 (s;ss) and 
 2 [
;








 i  > 1  
p
3=2  ww > ss
with ww < 0: Also, note that 
w < b 
 i  < 1=4  w: Hence, in this case the ED is welfare










  b 
: In this case the possibility to renegotiate matters. More precisely, let us introduce
exclusivity keeping the investment xed at the level xNoED = 0 chosen by the incumbent absent
28ED. The possibility to renegotiate removes foreclosure of the more ecient supplier E and makes
the incumbent's gain equal to the buyer's loss:
I(xNoED) = ED
I (xNoED)   NoED
I (xNoED) (19)
= NoED
B (xNoED)   ED
B (xNoED) =  B(xNoED) (20)
However, remember that b 
 > 
 so that ED stimulates the investment (xED > xNoED). Higher
investment increases the incumbent's payo under exclusivity (by revealed preferences), while the
eect on the buyer's payo depends on the sign of the external eect. The reason is that xED is




payo under exclusivity is ED
B (x) = (vE + x)=2.
It follows that, when the external eect is positive, the investment stimulated by ED benets
also the buyer. Hence, the buyer's loss due to exclusivity is mitigated and the incumbent's gain
is expanded, making the latter dominate. The incumbent can always elicit the buyer's acceptance
in a protable way.
Instead, when the external eect is negative, the higher investment stimulated by ED expands
not only the incumbent's gain from exclusivity, but also the buyer's loss. Then, it is not necessarily















The stronger the negative external eect, the larger the buyer's loss, the less likely that the





Hence, in this case the ED is signed for any  2 (ss;0] and 
  b 
:
Since the initial contract is renegotiable, rm E supplies the buyer also when the ED is in
place, but the investment promoted by ED reduces its eciency advantage (recall that  < 1) and



















vE + xED   vI   xED
2






and is satised i
 < 1=4  w:
Hence, in this case the ED is welfare detrimental for any  2 (ss;w] and 
  b 
::
To summarize, when the external eect is positive, the ED is always signed in equilibrium. It
is welfare detrimental i  2 (0;w) and 
  
w: If the external eect is (weakly) negative, the
ED is signed i  2 (s;ss) and 
 2 [
;
s)- in this case, the signed contract is always welfare
detrimental; or  2 [ss;0] and 
  
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